Papers

IN PREP

Rose, D., Lowery, J., Zhang, S, & Markman, E. (2024). Teleological essentialism in development.

Rose, D., Zhang, S, Nichols, S, Markman, E, & Gerstenberg, T. (2024). Cause and burn in development.

Rose, D., Nichols, S., & Gerstenberg, T. (2024). Teleology and diagnosticity.

Rose, D., Zhang, S, Gweon, H., & Gerstenberg, T. (2024). It’s the counterfactual thought that counts: counterfactual reasoning without counterfactual language.

Zhang, S, Gerstenberg, T, & Rose, D. (2024). The evolution of teleological essentialism across language models.

Yu, S., Mao, P., Zhang, S, Gerstenberg, T, & Rose, D. (2024). Children’s books, Netflix, and parent speech emphasize teleological properties when talking about categories.

PREPRINTS

Rose, D., & Gerstenberg, T. (2024). Teleological properties matter more in categorization.

Prinzing, M., Rose, D., Zhang, S., Tu, E., Concha, A., Schaffer, J., Rea, M., Gerstenberg, T., Knobe, J. (2024). From artifacts to human lives: Investigating the domain-generality of judgments about purposes. [preprint]

PUBLICATIONS

Rose, D., Zhang, S., Han, Q., & Gerstenberg, T. (2023). Teleology and generics. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 45, No. 45).

Zhang, S., She, S., Gerstenberg, T., & Rose, D. (2023). You are what you’re for? Essentialist categorization in large language models. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 45, No. 45).

Rose, D., Jaramillo, S., Nichols, S., & Horne, Z. (2022). Teleological essentialism across development. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 44, No. 44).

Rose, D., Sievers, E., & Nichols, S. (2021). Cause and burn. Cognition, 207(104517).

Rose, D. (2021). Mentalizing objects. In T. Lombrozo, S. Nichols & J. Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 4. Oxford University Press.

Buckwalter, W., Rose, D., & Turri, J. (2021). Impossible intentions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 58(4), 319-332.

Vekony, R., Mele, A., & Rose, D. (2021). Intentional action without knowledge. Synthese, 199(1), 1231-1243.

Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2020). Teleological essentialism: Generalized. Cognitive Science, 44(3), e12818.

Nadelhoffer, T., Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Nichols, S. (2020). Natural Compatibilism, indeterminism and intrusive metaphysics. Cognitive Science, 44(8), e12873.

Simpson, A., Alicke, M., Gordon, E., & Rose, D. (2020). The reasonably prudent person, or me? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 50(5), 313-323.

Rose, D., Machery, E., Stich, S., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Cova, F., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hannikainen, I., Hashimoto, T.,Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Olivola, C., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S.,Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2020). The ship of Theseus puzzle. In T. Lombrozo, S. Nichols & J. Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.

Rose, D. (2019). Cognitive science for the revisionary metaphysician. In A. Goldman & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.

Hannikainen, I., Machery, E., Rose, D., Stich, S., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Cova, F., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hashimoto, T., Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Olivola, C., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S., Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2019). For whom does determinism undermine moral responsibility? Surveying the conditions for free will across cultures. Frontiers in Psychology: Cognitive Science, 10, 2428 – 2441.

Stich, S., Rose, D., & Machery, E. (2019). Relativism and experimental philosophy. In M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge.

Petrik, J., & Rose, D. (2019). Spinoza’s dream argument: A response to introspective arguments for Freedom. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(11-12), 157-181.

Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2019). Teleological essentialism. Cognitive Science, 43(4), e12725.

Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2019). From punishment to universalism. Mind & Language, 34(1), 59-72.

Rose, D., Machery, E., Stich, S., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Cova, F., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hannikainen, I., Hashimoto, T., Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Olivola, C., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S., Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2019). Nothing at stake in knowledge. Noûs, 53(1), 224-247.

Rogers, R., Alicke, M. D., Taylor, S. G., Rose, D., Davis, T. L., & Bloom, D. (2019). Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame. Philosophical Psychology, 32(3), 404-427.

Cova, F., Olivola, C., Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hannikainen, I., Hashimoto, T., Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S., Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2019). De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment. Mind & Language, 34(3), 317-338.

Rose, D., Schaffer, J., & Tobia, K. (2018). Folk teleology drives persistence judgments. Synthese, 1-19.

McLaughlin, B., & Rose, D. (2018). On the matter of robot minds. In T. Lombrozo, S. Nichols & J. Knobe (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2 (pp. 316-332). Oxford University Press.*

Turri, J., Rose, D., & Buckwalter, W. (2018). Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Philosophical Studies, 175(10), 2507-2537.

Machery, E., Stich, S. Rose, D., Chatterjee, A., Karasawa, K., Struchiner, N., Sirker, S., Usui, N., Hashimoto, T. (2018). Gettier was framed. In M. Mizumoto, E. McCready & S. Stich (Eds.), Epistemology for the Rest of the World (pp. 123-148). Oxford University Press.*

Rose, D. (2017). Folk intuitions of actual causation: a two-pronged debunking explanation. Philosophical Studies, 174(5), 1323-1361.

Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. (2017). Folk mereology is teleological. Noûs, 51(2), 238-270. Expanded version reprinted in D. Rose (Ed.), Experimental Metaphysics (pp. 135-186). Bloomsbury Press.

Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Nichols, S. (2017). Neuroscientific prediction and the intrusion of intuitive metaphysics. Cognitive Science, 41(2), 482-502.

Rose, D., Machery, E., Stich, S., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Cova, F., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hannikainen, I., Hashimoto, T., Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Olivola, C., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S., Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2017). Behavioral circumscription and the folk psychology of belief: A study in ethno‐mentalizing. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 6(3), 193-203. [preprint]

Machery, E., Stich, S. Rose, D., Chatterjee, A., Karasawa, K., Struchiner, N., Sirker, S., Usui, N., Hashimoto, T. (2017). Gettier across cultures. Noûs, 51(3), 645-664.

Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., Alai, M., Adriano, A., Berniunas, R., Buchtel, E., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I., Cohnitz, D., Cova, F., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, A., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., Hannikainen, I., Hashimoto, T., Horowitz, A., Hristova, E., Jraissati, Y., Kadreva, V., Karasawa, K., Kim, H., Kim, Y., Lee, M., Mauro, C., Mizumoto, M., Moruzzi, S., Olivola, C., Ornelas, J., Osimani, B., Rosas Lopez, A., Romero, C., Sangoi, M., Sereni, A., Songhorian, S., Sousa, P., Struchiner, N., Tripodi, V., Usui, N., Vázquez del Mercado, A., Volpe, G., Vosgerichian, H., Zhang, X., & Zhu, J. (2017). The Gettier intuition from South America to Asia. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34(3), 517-541.*

Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., & Rose, D. (2017). Following the FAD: Folk attributions and theories of actual causation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(2), 273-294. [preprint]

Livengood, J., & Rose, D. (2016). Experimental philosophy and causal attribution. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (Eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy (pp. 434-449). Wiley-Blackwell.*

Turri, J., Buckwalter, W., & Rose, D. (2016). Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(3), 212-222.

Rose, D. (2015). Persistence through function preservation. Synthese, 192(1), 97-146.

Rose, D. (2015). Belief is prior to knowledge. Episteme, 12(3), 385-399.

Buckwalter, W., Rose, D., & Turri, J. (2015). Belief through thick and thin. Noûs, 49(4), 748-775.

Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2014). When words speak louder than actions: Delusion, belief, and the power of assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(4), 683-700.

Danks, D., Rose, D., & Machery, E. (2014). Demoralizing causation. Philosophical Studies, 171(2), 251-277.

Rose, D., & Danks, D. (2013). In defense of a broad conception of experimental philosophy. Metaphilosophy, 44(4), 512-532.

Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The lesson of bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(4), 599-619. [preprint]

Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. (2013). Knowledge entails dispositional belief. Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 19-50.

Machery, E., & Rose, D. (2013). Experimental philosophy. In H. Pashler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind (pp. 329-331). SAGE Publications.

Alicke, M., Gordon, E., & Rose, D. (2013). Hypocrisy: what counts?. Philosophical Psychology, 26(5), 673-701.

Rose, D., & Danks, D. (2012). Causation: Empirical trends and future directions. Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 643-653.

Rose, D., Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2012). Deep trouble for the deep self. Philosophical Psychology, 25(5), 629-646.

Alicke, M. D., & Rose, D. (2012). Culpable control and causal deviance. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6(10), 723-735.

Sytsma, J., Livengood, J., & Rose, D. (2012). Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43(4), 814- 820.

Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670-696. Reprinted in J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2 (pp. 229-252) Oxford University Press.

Alicke, M., & Rose, D. (2010). Culpable control or moral concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(4), 330-331.

Danks, D., & Rose, D. (2010). Diversity in representations; uniformity in learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 90-91.