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Hypocrisy: What counts?

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Hypocrisy is a multi-faceted concept that has been studied empirically by psychologists and discussed logically by philosophers. In this study, we pose various behavioral scenarios to research participants and ask them to indicate whether the actor in the scenario behaved hypocritically. We assess many of the components that have been considered to be necessary for hypocrisy (e.g., the intent to deceive, self-deception), factors that may or may not be distinguished from hypocrisy (e.g., weakness of will), and factors that may moderate hypocrisy (e.g., the degree of discrepancy between the attitude and behavior, whether the attitude is stated publicly, and the nature and severity of the behavioral consequences). Our findings indicate that lay conceptions of hypocrisy are often at odds with philosophical speculation. We argue that a complete understanding of the criteria for hypocrisy requires consideration of how ordinary people construe the concept. In contrast to some concepts (e.g., physical causation), for which lay conceptions, while interesting, are largely irrelevant, hypocrisy is an essential component of social judgment. One could argue, therefore, that folk wisdom is the ultimate arbiter of what hypocrisy entails. We note limitations of our methodology and suggest avenues for future research.

Keywords: Folk Wisdom; Hypocrisy; Intent to Deceive

1. Introduction

In contrast to human vices and shortcomings that are shared by a select few, many people fall prey to hypocrisy. To remain unremittably faithful to personal principles is a tough order, and even the best of us fall short of these ideals. In this regard, hypocrisy is probably a bit over-rated in the pantheon of bad behavior. This seems especially true when considering that high behavioral standards only increase the chances for hypocrisy. Those with lax standards who don't aspire to anything better have nowhere to go but up: they may be bad, but they're no hypocrites.

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Hypocrisy is a complex, multi-faceted concept, and the elements that are required to call an action “hypocritical” have been debated extensively by philosophers (Crisp & Cowton, 1994; Kittay, 1982; McKinnon, 1991; Shklar, 1985; Szabados & Soifer, 2004; Turner, 1990). Most investigators agree that hypocrisy involves some sort of inconsistency, and that hypocritical behaviors advance the actor’s self-interests. Hypocrites are people who implicitly or explicitly endorse principles that their behavior contradicts. Inconsistency by itself, however, does not necessarily denote hypocrisy. People are inconsistent for many reasons: they forget what they have endorsed; experience a weakness of will; or confront situations that evoke countervailing values. A person who forswears smoking, for example, may sincerely try to quit but fail. Or, an otherwise honest person might tell a small lie to avoid hurting a friend’s feelings. The former seems more like a motivational lapse whereas the latter promotes friendship. Whether people generally view such behaviors as hypocritical is an open question, one which we address in the present research.

Some philosophers have conjectured that hypocrisy also requires inauthenticity or the intent to deceive (Kittay, 1982; Szabados & Soifer, 1999). This is the salient characteristic of both history’s and literature’s most notorious hypocrites. In Dickens’ *David Copperfield*, Uriah Heep oozes humility while lusting after his employer’s money, daughter, and social position. Senator Strom Thurmond, one of Congress’s most fervid racial segregationists, was found to have fathered a daughter with an African-American maid who his family employed. And more recently, Reverend Ted Haggard, who inveighed tirelessly against homosexuality, was exposed by a male prostitute with whom he had repeated sexual encounters. In each case, the person flagrantly deceived others while pursuing contradictory aims.

While some sort of inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors is a generally-acknowledged component of hypocrisy, other aspects are subject to debate. In the examples cited above, Uriah Heep, Strom Thurmond, and Ted Haggard furthered their own hidden and nefarious agendas by intentionally deceiving others. Clearly the intent to deceive exacerbates hypocrisy, but is the intent to deceive a precondition for hypocrisy? While some philosophers conjecture that hypocrisy and intentional deception are inextricably linked (Kittay, 1982; Szabados & Soiffer, 1999), one can imagine borderline cases in which this connection might not be required. For example, a parent who honestly and with no attempt to deceive admits certain youthful indiscretions to their children while admonishing them to behave differently might be considered hypocritical by the children.

Two other unresolved questions in the philosophical literature on hypocrisy concern the roles of weakness of will (May & Holton, forthcoming; Szabados & Soifer, 1999) and self-deception. It could be argued, for example, that a person who contradicts his own expressed value for tolerance while in the “heat of passion” has behaved uncontrollably rather than hypocritically. With regard to self-deception, it is an open question as to whether someone who is truly deceived about the meaning of his or her actions is hypocritical in criticizing others for those same actions.

To date, discussions about what hypocrisy entails have been logically—rather than empirically—based. Philosophers have reasoned about the roles of intentional

deception, self-deception, and weakness of will in hypocrisy, but have yet to canvass the judgments of ordinary folks. Psychologists, on the other hand, have focused almost exclusively on the inconsistency element in trying to demonstrate hypocrisy in the laboratory.

In this paper, we concentrate on judgments of hypocrisy rather than on hypocritical behavior per se. Hypocrisy is an important and intriguing class of social judgment. Its importance derives from the fact that charges of hypocrisy can lead to significant social sanctions: hypocrites may be ignored or ostracized and their reputations damaged or destroyed. Hypocrisy is fascinating because it ranks high on the list of objectionable human behaviors or characteristics, and yet the hypocritical behavior by itself may be fairly innocuous or even desirable in some circumstances.

In addition to factors such as weakness of will and deception which pertain to the way hypocritical behavior is defined and construed (we refer to these as *endogenous* to hypocrisy), it is also important to consider potential moderators of perceived hypocrisy, such as whether the actor's attitude is publically expressed or privately held, the degree of discrepancy between the attitude and the contradictory behavior, the severity of the misdeed, and the nature of the outcome (factors which we refer to as *exogenous* to hypocrisy). Some examples of the questions these aspects of hypocrisy raise are as follows. Is a person who is sexually active before marriage more hypocritical if she tells others that premarital sex is wrong than if she simply implies it by her leadership in a church group? Is a person who drinks alcohol hypocritical for criticizing someone who takes drugs? Is a self-deluded gay male who criticizes other gays less hypocritical than one who is fully aware of his sexuality? Is a drug user who disavows drugs more hypocritical if he freebases cocaine than if he smokes pot? Is a sexist male employer who hires a female employee to satisfy a company's policy less hypocritical if the woman has a successful career in the company than an unsuccessful one?

To our knowledge, none of these endogenous or exogenous factors has been empirically investigated. Before describing the present study, we briefly review the state of the research literature on hypocrisy.

2. Empirical Research on Hypocrisy

The experimental study of hypocrisy has four prongs. Research in the cognitive dissonance tradition has treated hypocrisy as a brand of attitude-behavior inconsistency. In these studies, inconsistency is induced by asking participants to endorse desirable behaviors such as practicing safe sex and then reminding them of times that they failed to meet these standards (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). Consistent with the findings of hundreds of cognitive dissonance studies, participants repair their self-concepts by altering their behaviors or attitudes, such as by purchasing more condoms at the end of the experiment.

An important limitation of the aforementioned studies is that they examine past rather than contemporaneous behavior. An ingenious line of research by Batson and his colleagues remedies this problem by inducing participants to behave badly in the laboratory (Batson & Collins, 2011; Batson, Kobryniewicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). In a representative experiment, participants assign either an attractive or unattractive task to themselves and to another participant. Although virtually all participants agree that the fair assignment is via a coin flip, only about half follow this prescription. Furthermore, among those who flip the coin, 80% to 90% assign the more desirable task to themselves, indicating either a remarkable deviation from chance, or blatant cheating. Hypocrisy in these circumstances is reflected in the disparity between acknowledging the fairness of a coin flip and then failing to flip the coin, or cheating to obtain the desired outcome.

A third line of hypocrisy research examines discrepancies in self and social evaluation. In one study, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) used a version of Batson's moral choice paradigm but included observer participants who simply watched the transaction. Results showed that participants who assigned the preferred task to themselves considered their actions to be fairer than did observers of their actions. Valdesolo and DeSteno's findings could be construed as a form of social judgment hypocrisy in which people evaluate their moral transgressions more leniently than do observers.

Finally, Barden, Rucker, and Petty (2005) have shown that the order in which an attitude expression and the behavior that contradicts it occur influences perceived hypocrisy: actors who expressed their attitudes after engaging in contradictory behavior were seen as less hypocritical than those whose attitude expressions preceded their actions. This ordering effect seems to occur because people who express their attitudes after the behavior are seen to have a sincere desire to make reparations for their actions and, therefore, to be morally improved.

These four lines of research have different purposes. Batson's studies come closest to demonstrating hypocritical behavior in the laboratory. In the cognitive dissonance experiments, people are simply reminded of past inconsistencies. While this is an interesting application of cognitive dissonance, it constitutes a relatively weak demonstration of hypocrisy. Valdesolo and DeSteno used a between-subjects design; thus, none of the participants actually behaved inconsistently. Instead, hypocrisy was inferred by differences in fairness ratings between groups. Finally, Barden, Rucker and Petty were interested primarily in showing that the order in which attitudes and contradictory behaviors occur influences hypocrisy judgments.

3. Judgments of Hypocrisy

To date, therefore, the emphasis in empirical investigations of hypocrisy has been on demonstrating it experimentally, showing its relevance to traditional cognitive dissonance phenomena, extending it to social judgment, and assessing the implications of the order in which attitudes and behaviors are presented. Our goal

in the present research was different: namely, to explore the elements of attitude-inconsistent behavior that influence ordinary judgments of hypocrisy. While philosophical definitions of hypocrisy help to clarify the technical or logical meaning of the concept, ordinary beliefs about what constitutes hypocrisy elucidate how the term is ordinarily used.

At this initial stage of investigation we simply presented participants with behaviors that manipulated different dimensions of hypocrisy and then asked them whether they thought that the behavior described was hypocritical. Because idiosyncratic features of any given scenario can influence these judgments, we included multiple scenarios to assess each dimension.

The scenarios incorporated both endogenous and exogenous aspects of hypocrisy. By “endogenous” we refer to factors that philosophers have considered essential to the definition of hypocrisy, such as the intention to deceive others. Other endogenous factors we explored were the degree of discrepancy between the attitude expressed and the contradictory behavior, and the nature of the attitude-behavior discrepancy (in particular, whether hypocrisy requires public attitude pronouncements). We also included behavioral shortcomings that some philosophers have claimed are distinct from hypocrisy, such as weakness of the will and genuine self-deception.

Exogenous factors are psychological variables that may influence hypocrisy judgments, but that are not generally viewed as essential criteria for the application of the concept. These include factors such as the character and reputation of the actor, the need to consider competing social values, the severity of the behavior, and the nature of the outcome.

4. Investigating Ordinary Judgments of Hypocrisy

4.1. Method

Participants were students in introductory psychology courses in a large Midwestern university ($N = 959$; 67% female and 33% male). These courses comprise students from various majors. Data were collected in three sessions ($N = 451, 297, 211$). Participants in each session were exposed to 12 scenarios. A complete description of the scenarios is presented in appendix A. Although participants saw numerous scenarios, they were exposed to only one scenario in each of the sections described below. Accordingly, all comparisons that we report are between-subjects. For each scenario, participants were asked to indicate if they considered the actor described to be hypocritical. An average of 107 participants saw each version of a given scenario. Z-tests for comparing proportions were used to analyze the data.

In conjunction with our main study, we conducted another study with separate groups of participants ($N = 284$) to validate the differences among scenarios in the various categories. For example, regarding the weakness of will category, we asked a sample of participants to judge, for each of the four scenarios, how hard the actor in the story tried to resist the behavior described. The questions we asked for each

category are listed in appendix B. We report overall significance values among the items in each category, along with individual comparisons between each succeeding condition in appendix C. Because this initial research is exploratory in nature, error corrections were not used in testing the significance of each comparison. We did not, of course, expect every comparison to be significant, but we indicate which conditions differ significantly from one another. In the discussion pertaining to the results of each facet of hypocrisy, we summarize which of the differences in perceived hypocrisy were attended by significant differences in the manipulation checks. The only categories or comparisons we eliminated from the text were ones for which mean differences were miniscule or in the opposite direction from what was intended.

All statistical tests for hypocrisy judgments were two-tailed. Again, because our goals at this initial stage were largely exploratory, we did not use error corrections in making comparisons between hypocrisy conditions. This is relatively unimportant for comparisons that yielded extremely high significance values; however, comparisons that were significant at lower levels should be interpreted with caution.

4.2. Endogenous Factors

This section on endogenous factors covers factors that some philosophers have considered to be essential to the definition of hypocrisy, and therefore necessary components of the concept.

4.2.1. Intent to deceive

The first question we pursued is whether and when people believe that the intent to deceive is essential to hypocrisy (Kittay, 1982; Szabados & Soifer, 1999). Intuitively, there appear to be many circumstances in which deception would be unnecessary, such as when people fail to practice what they preach (Crisp & Cowton, 1994). Consider the example of parents who admit to various risky activities in their youth—cigarette smoking, unprotected sex, drugs—which they admonish their children to avoid. Even if the parents are completely frank about their youthful indiscretions, their behavior may be viewed as hypocritical. Four different scenarios were constructed to assess this issue.

4.2.1.1. Scenario 1

The first scenario involves a parent such as the one described above, who was a recreational drug user in his heyday but who now admonishes his son to avoid drugs. Because there is no intent to deceive, philosophical positions are divided as to whether this constitutes hypocrisy.

The majority of our sample (56.8%) viewed the honest parent as hypocritical. Interestingly, this percentage hardly changed when the parent withheld information about his former drug use (53.6%), $Z = 0.41$, $p = 0.68$. When the parent blatantly lied about his youthful activities, perceived hypocrisy increased significantly (69.3%) from both the honest condition, $Z = 2.57$, $p = 0.01$, and the withholding condition,

$Z = 2.03$, $p = 0.04$. The difference between the honest and dishonest parent versions is less marked than one might expect, primarily due to the relatively high frequency of hypocrisy that was already imputed in the honest parent version.

4.2.1.2. *Scenario 2*

The second scenario was one in which a woman, Jane, expresses the belief that premarital sex is wrong but does not disguise the fact that she is sexually active despite being unmarried. Nearly three-fourths (72.7%) of the sample believed that this was hypocritical. When the woman failed to disclose that she was sexually active, or blatantly lied about it, perceptions of hypocrisy increased significantly (94.4% and 96.1%, respectively), $Z = 3.21$, $p = 0.001$; $Z = 3.69$, $p < 0.001$. However, there was no significant difference in hypocrisy judgments between conditions in which Jane did not disclose her past and in which she actively deceived others, $Z = 0.19$, $p = 0.85$. As in the first scenario, therefore, the intent to deceive amplified perceived hypocrisy but was unnecessary to obtain a high frequency of it.

4.2.1.3. *Scenario 3*

In the third scenario of this genre, Paul believes that people should eat only healthy food, although he eats junk food himself. In the first variation, he tells others that he eats junk food. As in the other scenarios, this leads to a fairly high rate of perceived hypocrisy (45.8%). The proportion of participants who call Paul a hypocrite increases significantly when he withholds information about his junk food eating (84.2%), $Z = 4.69$, $p < 0.001$, or actively deceives others (97.2%), $Z = 6.60$, $p < 0.001$. More participants found Paul to be hypocritical when he purposively deceived others than when he simply withheld the fact that he is a junk-food eater, $Z = 2.42$, $p = 0.016$.

4.2.1.4. *Scenario 4*

The final scenario in this series was one in which a teacher advocated that his students refrain from smoking, despite his being a long-time smoker. When the teacher was honest about his smoking, his rate of perceived hypocrisy was lower than in any of the other scenarios (38.9%). As in the previous scenario, perceived hypocrisy increased steeply when the teacher withheld information about his smoking (71.4%), $Z = 3.77$, $p < 0.001$, and again when he lied about it (90.3%) $Z = 6.22$, $p < 0.001$. More participants called the teacher a hypocrite when he fibbed in comparison to when he simply withheld information, $Z = 2.72$, $p = 0.007$.

4.2.2. *Discussion*

The primary message from this first set of scenarios is that the intent to deceive others about one's attitudes or values is not necessarily required to judge an actor's behavior as hypocritical. About 73% of the sample considered a woman who engaged in premarital sex while openly believing that it was wrong to be hypocritical, and nearly 57% of the sample said that a parent who admits her youthful indiscretions to her children but forbids them to do the same is a hypocrite. Thus, in contrast to what some philosophers have concluded (Kittay, 1982; Szabados & Soifer, 1999, 2004), the

intent to deceive is not seen as necessary by laypeople to label an action as hypocritical.

Despite the finding that a high degree of hypocrisy is generally obtained even when people are candid about their own contradictory actions, hypocrisy judgments clearly depend on specific situational features. For example, the rate of hypocrisy was relatively low in the final scenario, in which a cigarette-smoking teacher preached anti-smoking to his students compared to a similar scenario in which a parent conveys anti-drug attitudes. Additionally, deception significantly increases judgments of hypocrisy. In all instances, simply withholding information about one's attitude-discrepant behavior increases hypocrisy, and outright lies increase them even more.

4.2.3. Weakness of will

Sometimes, people who wish to behave consistently with their values fail due to a lack of control, or "weakness of will" (May & Holton, forthcoming). This is especially true of addictive behaviors and sensual desires. Some philosophers have argued that failures of personal control are distinct from hypocrisy (Szabados & Soifer, 1999). Thus, a person who sincerely advocates a healthy lifestyle but falls prey to temptation may, according to this argument, suffer more from lack of discipline or self-control than from the insincerity that is typically thought to underlie hypocrisy. If this is true, then the frequency of hypocrisy judgments should be low in clear cases of personal control failures. We included three different sets of scenarios in this section to assess the frequency with which people ascribe hypocrisy to attitude-inconsistent actions that result from a weakness of will. We also varied whether failures of control occurred once or repeatedly to assess whether hypocrisy charges were avoided for momentary failures but applied to repeated ones.

4.2.3.1. Scenario 1

In the first variation of scenario 1, a woman who has been active in anti-drug campaigns, and who has resisted even prescription medications for a severe back injury, gives in one day to the temptation to ease her pain, but then never again takes any drugs. Relatively few participants viewed this as hypocritical (11.9%), indicating that a single weakness of will episode can deflect charges of hypocrisy. However, when the woman under the same circumstances becomes addicted to painkillers, perceived hypocrisy increases significantly to 45.5%, $Z = 5.20$, $p < 0.001$. In the third scenario, the anti-drug crusader takes painkillers at a party because her friends are doing so, but then never uses them again. This circumstance led to another significant increase in hypocrisy over the second scenario (64.4%), $Z = 2.62$, $p = 0.009$. Finally, when the woman has no chronic pain but simply takes painkillers repeatedly because she likes the way they make her feel, the vast majority of the sample saw her as hypocritical (91.8%).

4.2.3.2. Scenario 2

The second scenario depicts a priest who preaches against adultery and is pursued by a married woman. In the first version, he resists her advances for months, then finally

gives in and sleeps with her, but never does so again. The second version is the same, but in this case, he enters into a long-term affair with the woman. Participants were unimpressed with the priest's weakness of will regardless of whether the affair was a once-only (83.2%) or repeated (91.8%) event. And, importantly, whether the priest was a one-time or repeat offender did not produce a significant difference in hypocrisy ratings, $Z = 1.70$, $p = 0.089$. Manipulation check data also showed that participants did not perceive a difference in the ability to resist between these two versions.

4.2.3.3. *Scenario 3*

In the last scenario, a woman promises herself and her family that she is going to remain celibate until she is married. In one version, she simply decides that premarital sex is not wrong, whereas in the other, she gives in to sexual desire. Perceived hypocrisy was relatively low in the first version (37.6%) and non-significantly increased in the second (48.2%), $Z = 1.55$, $p = 0.159$.

4.2.4. *Discussion*

The findings from this section support the contention that failures of the will are often seen as distinct from hypocrisy, at least when they represent momentary lapses. Observers are far less tolerant of repeated lapses and tend to judge these as hypocritical. However, there are circumstances in which even one-time lapses are widely seen as hypocritical. Whereas the frequency of hypocrisy is relatively low in the case of an actor's one-time consumption of painkillers, an actor who capitulates to social pressure from her friends on a single occasion is seen as hypocritical by a large majority. Interestingly, hypocrisy ascriptions were not much greater for an avowed virgin who succumbs to sexual temptation than they were for the same woman who simply changes her mind about the merits of celibacy. And importantly, one-time failures are judged just as hypocritical as repeat failures when those failures involve a priest engaging in a sexual liaison. These results, then, suggest that one-time failures sometimes distinguish weakness of will episodes from hypocrisy, but they do not do so uniformly, especially when an actor's social role demands adherence to moral codes.

4.2.5. *Self-Deception*

Reasonable arguments can be marshaled to support the claim that self-deception is an essential component of hypocrisy, or conversely, that it is not necessary for hypocrisy. The belief that self-deception is required for hypocrisy suggests that people who knowingly contradict their avowals, but invent stories that bring their behavior more in line with their attitudes, are simply cynical manipulators (Szabados & Soifer, 2004). The opposing view claims that people who are truly self-deceived fail to recognize the discrepancy between their actions and values and, therefore, act sincerely rather than hypocritically. We constructed two different pairs of scenarios to assess people's views about the relationship between self-deception and hypocrisy.

4.2.5.1. *Scenario 1*

This scenario describes a student, Ronald, who parties far more than he studies. In the first version of the story, Ronald realizes that he is a poor student but is nevertheless critical of others who he believes are not serious students. Ninety percent of the sample saw Ronald as hypocritical. In the second version, Ronald truly believes that he is studying as hard as he can, and is again critical of other slackers. Hypocrisy was significantly reduced in this condition, although it remained at a fairly high level (74.3%), $Z = 2.82$, $p = 0.005$. Interestingly, however, the manipulation check data did not show a significant difference in judgments of self-deception between these two conditions.

4.2.5.2. *Scenario 2*

The second scenario describes a college student who has strong feelings of attraction to other men, but who is active in an anti-gay organization. In the first version of the story, the student is aware that he is gay, whereas in the other he is convinced that he isn't. A high frequency of hypocrisy was attributed in both cases (72.3% and 85.5%, respectively), although in this instance, perceived hypocrisy was significantly increased rather than decreased by self-deception, $Z = 2.18$, $p = 0.029$.

4.2.6. *Discussion*

Although we included only two sets of scenarios in this section, the findings reveal a fairly complex role for self-deception in hypocrisy. First, it should be noted that self-deception only weakly influenced hypocrisy judgments, since the frequency of these judgments remained high regardless of whether or not the actor was self-deluded. In the first set of scenarios, a poor student was seen as less hypocritical when he actually thought that he was a good student. Possibly, a segment of our college-student sample was especially sympathetic to this species of self-deception, and in fact, the manipulation check data suggested that they did not even ascribe a stronger degree of self-deception in this condition. Students had the reverse reaction to a self-deceived gay male, however, especially when he was actively involved in an anti-gay organization. Apparently, failure to recognize one's sexual orientation is an aggravating rather than a mitigating circumstance when the individual is insensitive to the sexual orientation of others. These results show, therefore, that some cases of self-deception are indistinct from hypocrisy; in particular, those in which actor must go to great lengths to maintain their delusions while simultaneously denigrating others who engage in the same behaviors.

4.2.7. *Degree of discrepancy*

Although all philosophers and psychologists agree that hypocrisy entails attitude-inconsistent behaviors, the strength of this discrepancy varies. For example, if an anti-drug crusader is caught soliciting illegal drugs, there is a close relationship between the attitude expressed and the discrepant behavior. But what if the crusader

becomes addicted to prescription drugs or alcohol? Here the relationship is less clear, and there does not seem to be any easy philosophical answer to the problem. A good example of this issue is raised by Barden, Rucker, and Petty (2005). In their introduction, they note the case of the former education secretary, William Bennett, whose huge gambling losses in the wake of his “Book of Virtues” were widely cited as hypocritical. But are they? Does a general call for virtue mean that any deviation from virtue represents hypocrisy? We included three separate scenarios to assess people’s judgments of hypocrisy for attitude-behavior categories that varied from extremely distant to extremely close.

4.2.7.1. Scenario 1

In the first scenario, a parent, who forbids his daughter to get a tattoo, is described as a cigarette smoker, someone with body piercings, or the possessor of a tattoo. The first two categories were included simply to see if any socially undesirable behavior, regardless of its distance from the implied or expressed attitude, would be seen as hypocritical. Results showed that more participants indicated that the parent was hypocritical when he had a tattoo (74.7%) in comparison to when he smoked two packs of cigarettes (14.2%), $Z = 8.81$, $p < 0.001$, or had body piercings (23.7%), $Z = 6.04$, $p < 0.001$. Clearly, the correspondence between the attitude and behavior categories made a large difference in hypocrisy ratings.

4.2.7.2. Scenario 2

The second scenario depicted a situation in which a student who ate three cheeseburgers for lunch subsequently helped in a community project to eliminate pornography, in a community program to raise awareness about exercise, or walked in a relay to support the fight against heart disease. More people viewed the student as hypocritical when he participated in a relay for heart disease (62.5%) than when he volunteered to raise awareness about exercise (35.1%), $Z = 3.88$, $p < 0.001$, or when he volunteered to help eliminate pornography (4%), $Z = 10.74$, $p < 0.001$. In addition, participants were more likely to ascribe hypocrisy to the student when the community project concerned exercise than when the program involved pornography, $Z = 6.08$, $p < 0.001$.

4.2.7.3. Scenario 3

The next scenario involved a man who visited the X-rated section of a video store. Later in the day, he protested casino gambling, helped at a church bake sale, or helped in a community program to eliminate pornography. Obviously, more participants viewed the last condition as hypocritical (89.3%) than either the gambling version (5.6%), $Z = 11.79$, $p < 0.001$, or the bake-sale version (42.6%), $Z = 8.29$, $p < 0.001$. Notably, the frequency of hypocrisy judgments was higher in bake sale scenario in comparison to the casino condition, $Z = 5.42$, $p < 0.001$. Apparently, engagement in church-related activities implies attitudes that are consistent with most Western religions, such as anti-pornography beliefs.

4.2.8. Discussion

The scenarios in this section make the simple point that the *degree* of discrepancy between attitudes and behavior affects the frequency with which hypocrisy is ascribed. In some instances, however, such as when a person shops for pornography and then helps in a church bake sale, an ostensibly large discrepancy still produces fairly high hypocrisy frequencies. Apparently, people who believe that church attendance entails commitment to various behaviors, such as avoiding pornography, are likely to view such actions as hypocritical.

4.3. Exogenous Factors

In this section, we explore factors that are “exogenous” to hypocrisy; that is, elements that may increase or decrease perceptions of hypocrisy, but that are not seen as essential components of its definition by philosophers and psychologists.

4.3.1. Do public pronouncements heighten hypocrisy?

The scenarios in the previous section showed that attitudes need not be stated explicitly for people to be considered hypocritical; rather, it suffices for behavior to contradict the assumptions of the social role that a person occupies. The question we ask in this section is whether stating one’s attitude publicly increases hypocrisy beyond mere possession of the attitude. We constructed three different scenarios to address this issue.

4.3.1.1. Scenario 1

The first story involves a woman named Diane who believes that extra-marital sex is wrong, but who nevertheless has been having sex with a number of different men. In one condition, Diane never publically expresses her views to others; in another she openly expresses her views; and in a third, Diane chastises others who are sexually active. Although Diane was seen as a hypocrite by a large majority in all conditions, she was less likely to be considered a hypocrite when she kept her belief private (69.7%) than when she either publically shared her attitudes (98.6%), $Z = 4.56$, $p < 0.001$, or chastised a friend for the same behavior (98.7%), $Z = 4.71$, $p < 0.001$. There was no significant difference in hypocrisy judgments when Diane publically shared her attitudes in comparison to when she became upset with a friend, $Z = 0.71$, $p = 0.80$. The lack of significance in this comparison is most likely due to the ceiling effect on perceived hypocrisy in these conditions.

4.3.1.2. Scenario 2

In the second story, John believes that it is wrong to cheat on tests despite the fact that he routinely does so. In one story he has never spoken of his views to anyone (*private condition*); in the second he has never spoken of them but secretly looks down on others who cheat (*private/judgmental condition*); in the third he publically condemns cheating (*public condition*), and in the fourth he berates a cheater (*public/judgmental condition*). The first condition had the lowest frequency of hypocrisy

ascriptions (48.1%) and yielded a significantly lower frequency of hypocrisy than the *private/judgmental condition* (91.2%), $Z=7.05$, $p < 0.001$, the *public condition* (95.8%), $Z=6.28$, $p < 0.001$, and the *public/judgmental condition* (97.4%), $Z=8.66$, $p < 0.001$. Participants in the *private condition* did not differ from those in the *public condition*, $Z=1.06$, $p=0.29$. However, the proportion who found the actor in the *private condition* to be hypocritical was significantly less than the proportion who ascribed hypocrisy in the *public/judgmental condition*, $Z=1.95$, $p=0.052$. Finally, the *public/ judgmental condition* did not significantly differ from the *public condition* in terms of the proportion of the sample that found John's actions to be hypocritical (95.8%), $Z=0.01$, $p=0.60$.

4.3.1.3. Scenario 3

The third story involves Heather, who believes that using illegal drugs is wrong but who nevertheless smokes pot. In one version, Heather keeps her beliefs to herself; in another, she expresses her view to her friends; and in a third, she gets upset with another person who smokes pot. Again, simple inconsistency leads to a high rate of hypocrisy judgments (64.5%), which is significantly less than the rate of hypocrisy judgments in both the second version (93.1%), $Z=3.96$, $p < 0.001$, and the third version (96.1%), $Z=4.63$, $p < 0.001$. As with the previous scenario, there is no significant difference in the proportion of hypocrisy judgments when Heather publicly expresses her views in comparison to when she shares her attitudes and chastises a friend for smoking marijuana, $Z=0.45$, $p=0.65$.

4.3.2. Discussion

The findings from this section show again that public expressions are not necessary to obtain a high frequency of hypocrisy judgments, although they sometimes increase the frequency with which hypocrisy is ascribed. One of the most interesting findings, from the second scenario in particular, is that what matters most in situations such as these is the hypocrite's attitude toward others. The fact that actors whose behaviors contradict their own attitudes are critical of others who do the same suffices to render a judgment of hypocrisy in almost all participants.

4.3.3. Outcome

Hypocritical behavior can have positive outcomes. In fact, hypocrisy can even entail improved behavior. Consider a racist football team owner who recognizes that it is in his best interest to hire talented African-American players, although he despises them. The owner is open to charges of hypocrisy, but his behavior trumps that of following his instincts and refusing to employ African Americans. Research on outcome bias (Alicke & Davis, 1989; Baron & Hershey, 1988) has demonstrated that event outcomes sometimes provide an independent basis for evaluating behavior, which suggests that the racist owner who effects positive outcomes might be seen as less hypocritical than one whose actions have deleterious consequences. In this section, we use three different scenarios to assess whether attitude-inconsistent

actions that produce positive outcomes reduce perceived hypocrisy in comparison to identical decisions that produce negative ones.

4.3.3.1. *Scenario 1*

In this scenario, a sexist employer hires a female employee to a high-level job so that he cannot be accused of sexism. In one variation, the employee is happy and has a successful career (33.1%), whereas in the other variation, things work out poorly (37.9%). Interestingly, no difference was obtained in hypocrisy judgments, suggesting that people who do not discriminate are not generally seen as hypocritical if their behavior is favorable, regardless of its outcome, $Z = 0.79$, $p = 0.43$.

4.3.3.2. *Scenario 2*

The second scenario was similar to the first. In this story, the chairman of a medical department is forced to hire a woman. In the first variation, the woman has a brilliant medical career whereas in the second she has a difficult time fitting in and leaves the medical profession. As in the previous scenario, perceived hypocrisy was relatively low in both conditions (35% and 25%, respectively), and the difference between the two conditions was non-significant, $Z = 1.42$, $p = 0.145$.

4.3.3.3. *Scenario 3*

The findings were very different in the final scenario. Here, a parent who regrets having dropped out of high school is very demanding on his son, requiring him to study hard and practice the piano. In one version, the son becomes a famous pianist whereas in the other he develops emotional problems and drops out of school. The rate of perceived hypocrisy was far less when the outcome of the father's demanding regimen was favorable (18%) than when it was unfavorable (55%), $Z = 5.49$, $p < 0.001$.

4.3.4. *Discussion*

The first two scenarios in this section suggest that as long as the behavioral outcome is beneficial, private contradictory attitudes do not lead to a very high degree of perceived hypocrisy. However, the findings for the third scenario were quite different. Here, a scholastically demanding father who himself dropped out of school is seen as far less hypocritical if his son benefits as a result of his regimen than if he flounders. In contrast to the other two scenarios, the father in this condition can be seen as having the best interests of his son at heart, at least when his son benefits from his intentions.

4.3.5. *Competing values*

Another exogenous component of hypocrisy involves the influence of competing values. People may wish to behave in accord with their convictions but relent due to rival social values, such as the desire to be considerate to others. We included two different scenarios to see whether inconsistent behavior that reflects prosocial concerns reduces hypocrisy judgments.

4.3.5.1. *Scenario 1*

The first scenario described a vegetarian who ate some stuffing at Thanksgiving that he knew contained meat. In one condition no further information was provided, whereas in the other, he ate the stuffing to appease his grandmother. Perceived hypocrisy was relatively low in both cases (43% and 30%, respectively), $Z = 1.76$, $p = 0.079$.

4.3.5.2. *Scenario 2*

In the second scenario, a woman who had been active in anti-racist organizations learned that her distant relatives were racists. In one version of this scenario, she hid her disgust of their attitudes when interacting with them to avoid conflict, whereas in the other version, she did so to gain their approval. Perceived hypocrisy was significantly greater when the woman was seeking to gain approval (54%) as opposed to avoiding conflict (34%), $Z = 2.78$, $p = 0.005$.

4.3.6. *Discussion*

As the findings from these scenarios show, the motives for inconsistent behavior may be another important factor in hypocrisy judgments. Hypocrisy was reduced when the actor's motives were prosocial, as in the case where attitude-inconsistent behaviors involved avoiding conflict with relatives. (However, the manipulation check, which asked about degree of conflict, was non-significant). The same difference did not occur in the first scenario, however, perhaps because participants, the large majority of whom were presumably meat-eaters, did not ascribe a high degree of hypocrisy to the vegetarian who ate meat.

4.3.7. *Severity of the behavior*

Hypocritical behaviors vary in their severity. For example, a person who expresses anti-drug views can contradict this attitude by smoking pot on one occasion, or with a heroin addiction. In this section, we vary the severity of the behavioral act in three separate scenarios to observe its effect on hypocrisy judgments.

4.3.7.1. *Scenario 1*

The story in the first scenario involved a man named Steve who told his friends that pornography is disgusting, but who was then found to have Victoria's Secret catalogues in his room, hard-core pornography, or child pornography. Even when the behavior involved the fairly innocuous Victoria's Secret catalogue, a relatively high frequency of hypocrisy judgments (51.4%) were obtained, and this was significantly increased in both the hard-core (89.5%), $Z = 5.04$, $p < 0.001$, and child pornography conditions (98.7%), $Z = 6.65$, $p < 0.001$. A higher proportion of the sample considered Steve to be hypocritical when he was found to own child pornography in comparison to hard core pornography, $Z = 2.02$, $p = 0.043$.

4.3.7.2. Scenario 2

In the second story, a parent told her daughter that it is sinful to have sex before marriage, although the parent did so, or that she should always complete her homework as soon as she gets home from school, although the parent did not do so. The rate of hypocrisy was much greater in the sex (75.8%) than in the homework variation (22.3%), $Z = 9.25$, $p < 0.001$, although the manipulation check was non-significant in this instance.

4.3.7.3. Scenario 3

The final scenario described a woman named Linda who thinks that infidelity is immoral, but who either cheats on her husband by sleeping with another man, or cheats on her boyfriend by kissing another man. Participants ascribed hypocrisy at a higher rate in the sexual infidelity scenario (88.2%) than in the kissing scenario (71.4%), $Z = 2.42$, $p = 0.016$.

4.3.8. Discussion

Two things are noteworthy about the results in this section. First, the severity of wrongdoing clearly influences judgments of hypocrisy, and second, even mild inconsistencies between attitude and behavior lead to a fairly high rate of hypocrisy when sexual attitudes are involved. On the other hand, mild inconsistencies involving parents exhorting their children to complete their homework when the parents were not as diligent do not produce very high rates of hypocrisy.

5. General Discussion

To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess ordinary notions of hypocritical behavior. While the opinions of untutored laypersons do not provide an infallible basis for construing hypocrisy, they constitute the only basis for understanding how hypocrisy is actually assessed in everyday social life. Beyond the fact that hypocrisy necessarily entails some sort of inconsistency between people's behaviors and their explicitly-stated or implied attitudes, most of the aspects of hypocrisy that philosophers have debated, such as whether it requires an intent to deceive, or is distinguished from weaknesses of will, remain active areas of debate. Lay conceptions of hypocrisy are an important source for informing these arguments.

The findings of this empirical study confirm one other thing that virtually all philosophical treatments of hypocrisy acknowledge; that is, that hypocrisy is a complex, multifaceted concept. Before considering some of our specific findings and their implications, it is important to consider what such findings contribute to the study of hypocrisy. On the one hand, it could be argued that lay conceptions of hypocrisy are largely irrelevant to a logical analysis of the concept. We agree with this point: lay judgments are sometimes error-prone and based more on emotional reactions than on careful analysis. On the other hand, while logical distinctions are

vital for identifying the components of hypocrisy and clarifying the possible conditions that underlie it, they cannot by themselves resolve, for example, whether the intent to deceive is necessary for hypocrisy, whether weakness of will negates it, or whether self-deception is necessarily involved.

So, whereas philosophical analyses can sharpen and expand people's notions of hypocrisy, the most important connotations of hypocrisy are reflected in the way people actually interpret the concept. Another way of stating this is to say that ordinary beliefs define what hypocrisy is, whereas philosophical analyses elucidate what it might be if people's understanding were more thorough or sophisticated. Of course, if we don't know what the lay conceptions are, we can hardly have a complete grasp of how to clarify them.

For the most part, the findings of this study, at least regarding what we have called "endogenous factors"—those that pertain to essential elements of hypocrisy—are fairly consistent with philosophical intuition on this topic, although the exceptions and qualifications are intriguing. For example, self-deception is sometimes distinguished from hypocrisy while in other cases it is not. A lackadaisical student who is critical of other slackers is seen somewhat *less* frequently as hypocritical if he is self-deceived, but a gay male who participates in anti-gay organizations is seen *more* frequently as hypocritical as a result of his being deceived about his sexual orientation. Both the nature of the delusion and the severity of the offense may be important moderating factors in this regard. Many students probably miscalculate the degree of their academic commitment and can be excused to some extent for thinking that they study more than others. Being mistaken about one's sexual orientation requires more active self-deception, and participating in anti-gay organizations does more harm to others. This latter conjecture is consistent with other findings from this study regarding the severity of the offense: with all other things being equal, people are seen as more hypocritical for more severe than for milder offenses.

One of the most interesting findings of the present study is that people are frequently seen as hypocritical even when they make no attempt to deceive, although the intent to deceive clearly increases perceived hypocrisy. For example, parents who admit to their former drug use but who exhort their children to refrain from drugs are frequently seen as hypocrites. Similarly, an unmarried woman who believes that premarital sex is wrong but freely acknowledges that she is sexually active is seen as hypocritical by a large majority. Although there is no direct attempt to deceive in these actions, what makes them seem hypocritical is the air of superiority they evince. Perhaps participants suspected that the parents believed they had a superior ability to handle drugs than their children, or that the woman believed that premarital sex is wrong for others but not for herself.

Although the presumption of superiority is not an element of hypocrisy that features prominently in most philosophical accounts, our data suggest that it can be an important aggravating factor in judgments of hypocritical behavior. In addition to the foregoing examples, a student who cheats while condemning cheating was seen as hypocritical by approximately twice as many participants if he looked down on other

cheaters. Furthermore, this presumption of superiority increased perceived hypocrisy to the same extent regardless of whether his condemnation of others occurred only in his mind or was publicly expressed.

As philosophers have conjectured (Szababoa & Soifer, 1999, 2004), failures of the will are sometimes distinct from hypocrisy. Our data show that the frequency of ascribed hypocrisy is sometimes reduced when inconsistent behavior represents a lack of personal control. However, people are far less willing to grant such leniency in the case of repeated offenses, even if a physiological addiction is involved. And, they have no sympathy in the case of a priest who resists sexual temptation for months, even if his transgression occurs only once. In fact, people view him as a hypocrite as frequently for one sexual transgression as for a long-term affair.

An issue in hypocrisy that has been largely overlooked concerns the closeness of the connection between the attitude that is expressed and the behavior that contradicts it. Decisions about which behaviors actually contradict the actor's attitudes are likely to be strongly influenced by personal values. We assume that political conservatives would see William Bennett's gambling debts as less relevant to his promotion of "virtues," and Rush Limbaugh's addiction to prescription drugs as less relevant to his railing against drug addicts, than would political liberals. The importance of personal values in hypocrisy judgments perhaps explains why over 40% of the sample thought that a man who visited the X-rated section of a video store and later in the day helped at a church bake sale was hypocritical.

Some caveats are in order. Although our samples were fairly large, they were not very diverse: all the participants were college students in the Midwest who probably constitute a relatively homogenous demographic group. Clearly, further research is needed that canvasses other groups, especially older participants and those from other geographic regions. One of the things that our findings highlight is that the nature of hypocrisy is in some ways dependent on the attitudes of those who are doing the judging. Since hypocrisy often involves deep-seated values, it is likely to show strong self in social judgment effects (Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005), that is, effects in which people's personal beliefs, opinions, preferences and values influence their judgments of others.

Furthermore, although we included a large number of scenarios, we could not, of course, cover every possible component of hypocrisy; nor could we assess all possible variations of each component. One complication is that it is virtually impossible to study each individual component of hypocrisy in isolation from all the others. In other words, variations in weakness of will may entail variations in self-deception, severity, competing values, and so on. The only solution to this is to study a wide variety of examples and situations, and we view our data as a significant step forward in this regard, but far from the definitive word on how people construe the various components of hypocrisy.

One important topic that the present data do not adequately address concerns the role of reward contingencies in perceived hypocrisy. We assessed some of these questions under the heading of "Competing Values," but the topic is worthy of further investigation. Szabados and Soiffer (2004) pose an interesting thought

experiment in this regard. Is a man who moves to a new community and joins a church in order to advance his wife's prospects for advancement in the community a hypocrite? What if the man's choice of joining the church was governed by a negative rather than a positive reinforcement contingency such as to avoid being ostracized in the community? This latter question shades into the more extreme case of what Szabados and Soiffer refer to as "victim hypocrisy." We assume that people would refrain from calling a political dissenter who pretended to follow the policy line to avoid severe reprisals a hypocrite, but this assumption awaits empirical confirmation.

Finally, while posing hypothetical scenarios to research participants has the advantage of allowing multiple scenarios to be evaluated by many participants at once, it cannot substitute for creating more realistic situations in the laboratory. Further research is needed in which individual components of hypocrisy, are experimentally manipulated to assess their influence on judgments about an actor's degree of hypocrisy.

Appendix A: Scenarios

Intent to Deceive

Scenario 1

1. A parent tells his 17 year-old son that although he drank alcohol and smoked pot when he was 17 years old, he does not want his son to do so.
2. A parent tells his 17 year-old son that he does not want him to drink alcohol or smoke pot. The parent drank alcohol and smoked pot when he was his son's age, although he does not tell this to his son.
3. A parent tells his 17 year-old son that he does not want him to drink alcohol or smoke pot. The parent drank alcohol and smoked pot when he was his son's age, but he tells his son that he never smoked or drank.

Scenario 2

1. Jane believes it is wrong to have premarital sex and shares her attitudes with other people. Jane had pre-marital sex and tells this to others when sharing her attitudes.
2. Jane believes it is wrong to have premarital sex and shares her attitudes with other people. Jane had pre-marital sex but does not mention this when sharing her attitudes.
3. Jane believes it is wrong to have premarital sex and shares her attitudes with other people. Jane had pre-marital sex but tells everyone she was a virgin when she was married when sharing her attitudes.

Scenario 3

1. Paul believes that one should eat only healthy food and beverages and shares his attitudes with other people. However, Paul eats fast-food meals several times a month and tells this to others when sharing his attitudes.
2. Paul believes that one should eat only healthy food and beverages and shares his attitudes with other people. However, Paul eats fast food meals several times a month but does not mention this when sharing his attitudes.

3. Paul believes that one should eat only healthy food and beverages and shares his attitudes with other people. However, Paul eats fast food meals several times a month but tells everyone he doesn't eat fast food when sharing his attitudes.

Scenario 4

1. Dan, a teacher, tells his students that smoking cigarettes is unhealthy and addictive. Dan has been smoking for the past ten years and tells this to his students.
2. Dan, a teacher, tells his students that smoking cigarettes is unhealthy and addictive. Dan has been smoking for the past ten years but does not mention this to his students.
3. Dan, a teacher, tells his students that smoking cigarettes is unhealthy and addictive. Dan has been smoking for the past ten years but tells his students he does not smoke.

Weakness of Will

Scenario 1

1. Jane has always stated that she hates drugs and was active in anti-drug campaigns when she was in college. Even after suffering a severe back injury in a car accident, Jane still resisted the temptation to take pills to ease her pain. One day, however, Jane gave in to the temptation and took some pills to ease her pain. After this, she never took any more of the painkillers.
2. Jane has always stated that she hates drugs and was active in anti-drug campaigns when she was in college. Even after suffering a severe back injury in a car accident, Jane still resisted the temptation to take pills to ease her pain. One day, however, Jane gave in to the temptation and took some pills to ease her pain. After this, she became addicted to the painkillers and had to enter rehabilitation.
3. Jane has always stated that she hates drugs and was active in anti-drug campaigns when she was in college. Even after suffering a severe back injury in a car accident, Jane still resisted the temptation to take pills to ease her pain. One day, however, Jane is with a group of friends at a party who are taking pain killers because they like the way they feel. Jane gives in to their pressure and takes some herself. After this, she never took any more painkillers.
4. Jane has always stated that she hates drugs and was active in anti-drug campaigns when she was in college. However, although Jane has no physical ailments, she frequently takes painkillers because she likes the way they make her feel.

Scenario 2

1. A priest who frequently preaches about the evils of adultery is being pursued by one of his congregation members. The woman, who is married, is extremely attractive and makes open sexual advances, but the priest continually resists her advances. After months of resisting the temptation, he finally gives in and sleeps with the woman. After this, the priest ends the relationship and never speaks to the woman again.
2. A priest who frequently preaches about the evils of adultery is being pursued by one of his congregation members. The woman, who is married, is extremely attractive and makes open sexual advances, but the priest continually resists her advances. After months of resisting the temptation, he finally gives in and sleeps with the woman. After this, the priest falls into a long-term sexual relationship with the woman.

Scenario 3

1. Nikki had promised herself and her family that she would remain a virgin until she was married. However, Nikki recently changed her mind and decided that there was

nothing wrong with pre-marital sex. Last night, Nikki had sex with her long-term boyfriend.

2. Nikki had promised herself and her family that she would remain a virgin until she was married. However, last night Nikki had sex with her boyfriend. Nikki found herself in the heat of the moment and felt it was impossible to say no.

Self-Deception

Scenario 1

1. Ronald is a student who does a lot of partying and very little studying. However, Ronald has absolutely convinced himself that he is a serious student and truly believes that he is working as hard as he can. As a matter of fact, this belief is so entrenched that if you were to tell Ronald otherwise he would just look at you puzzled, as you were telling him that $2 + 2 = 6$. Thus, Ronald genuinely believes that he is a serious, hard-working student. Nevertheless, Ronald is very critical of other students who he believes are not serious enough.
2. Ronald is a student who does a lot of partying and very little studying. Ronald realizes that he is a poor student, but he is nevertheless very critical of other students who he believes are not serious enough.

Scenario 2

1. Rick is a college student who has experienced strong feelings of sexual attraction toward other men. However, Rick has buried his feelings and has really convinced himself that he is not gay. Rick is active in an anti-gay organization that preaches that homosexuality is a sin.
2. Rick is a college student who has experienced strong feelings of sexual attraction toward other men. Rick is aware that he is gay and does little to control his sexual feelings. Rick is active in many anti-gay organizations that preach that homosexuality is a sin.

Degree of Discrepancy

Scenario 1

1. A parent forbids his daughter from getting a tattoo. However, the parent smokes two packs of cigarettes per day.
2. A parent forbids his daughter from getting a tattoo. However, the parent has body piercings.
3. A parent forbids his daughter from getting a tattoo. However, the parent has a tattoo.

Scenario 2

1. A student ate three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries for lunch. Later on that day the student was helping in a community program to eliminate pornography.
2. A student ate three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries for lunch. Later on that day, the student was helping in a community program to raise awareness on the importance of exercise.
3. A student ate three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries for lunch. Later on that day, the student walked in a relay for life in order to support the fight against cholesterol and heart disease.

Scenario 3

1. Early in the afternoon, a man was looking around the x-rated section of a video store. Later that afternoon, the man was protesting to eliminate casino gambling.

2. Early in the afternoon, a man was looking around the x-rated section of a video store. Later that afternoon, the man was helping out at a community church bake sale.
3. Early in the afternoon, a man was looking around the x-rated section of a video store. Later that afternoon, the man was helping in a community program to eliminate pornography.

Public Pronouncements

Scenario 1

1. Diane believes that it is wrong to have sex outside of marriage, but she never publically preaches her views to others. Her friends found out that she has secretly been having sex with a number of different men.
2. Diane believes that it is wrong to have sex outside of marriage and shares her attitude with others. However, her friends found out that she has secretly been having sex with a number of different men.
3. Diane believes it is wrong to have sex outside of marriage and tells others of her attitude. Recently Diane's friend Jennifer had sex. Diane got really upset with Jennifer and told her that she was wrong to have premarital sex. However, Jennifer recently found out that Diane has secretly been having sex with a number of different men.

Scenario 2

1. John has always believed that it is wrong to cheat on tests. He has never told anybody that he feels this way. Three weeks ago John was caught cheating.
2. John has always held the belief that it is wrong to cheat on tests. He has never told anybody that he feels this way, but he has always secretly looked down upon others who cheat on exams. One day last quarter, John cheated on an exam.
3. John has always believed that it is wrong to cheat on tests and he has expressed his attitude to all of his friends and classmates. Three weeks ago John was caught cheating.
4. John has always held the belief that it is wrong to cheat on test and he has expressed his attitude to all of his friends and classmates. Recently John found out that one of his good friends, Tom, cheated on an exam. John got really upset with Tome and told him that he was wrong to cheat. Three weeks after John got upset at Tom, John was caught cheating.

Scenario 3

1. Heather believes that using illegal drugs is wrong. She has never told her friends her belief. However, one friend recently found out that Heather smokes pot.
2. Heather believes that using illegal drugs is wrong. She has shared this attitude with her friends. However, one friend recently found out that Heather smokes pot.
3. Heather believes that using illegal drugs is wrong. She has shared this attitude with her friends. Recently, Heather got really upset with a friend after discovering the friend had experimented with marijuana. However, this friend found out that Heather smokes pot.

Outcome

Scenario 1

1. A sexist employer hires a female employee to a high-level job so that other people will not be able to accuse him of sexism. The employee is very happy at the company and has a successful career.

2. A sexist employer hires a female employee to a high-level job so that other people will not be able to accuse him of sexism. The employee is very unhappy at the company and quits after a couple of weeks.

Scenario 2

1. Lawrence is the chairman of the cardiology department at a teaching hospital in the northwest. Lawrence prefers to hire men rather than women for his medical team because he does not believe that women make good doctors. However, the hospital administration has demanded that he hire a woman for his team. Lawrence reluctantly hires a woman who winds up being the star of his team and goes on to have a brilliant medical career.
2. Lawrence is the chairman of the cardiology department at a teaching hospital in the northwest. Lawrence prefers to hire men rather than women for his medical team because he does not believe that women make good doctors. However, the hospital administration has demanded that he hire a woman for his team. Lawrence reluctantly hires a woman who has an extremely difficult time fitting in with his team and winds up quitting her medical career.

Scenario 3

1. As a teenager, Ryan often got in trouble and failed to graduate from high school. Ryan regretted never receiving his high school diploma and was very strict when it came to his son's academic performance. Ryan would make his son study for school and practice the piano for hours on end. Ryan's son ended up becoming a famous professional pianist.
2. As a teenager, Ryan often got in trouble and failed to graduate from high school. Ryan regretted never receiving his high school diploma and was very strict when it came to his son's academic performance. Ryan would make his son study for school and practice the piano for hours on end. Ryan's son ended up developing serious emotional issues due to his father's strictness and eventually dropped out of high school.

Competing Values

Scenario 1

1. Noah had been a practicing vegetarian for years. However, his grandmother, a recent immigrant, does not know of his lifestyle. In order to avoid upsetting her, last Thanksgiving Noah ate a small helping of his Grandmother's stuffing that he knew contained meat.
2. Noah had been a practicing vegetarian for years. His family was aware and accepting of his lifestyle. However, last Thanksgiving, Noah cooked a turkey and ate a small helping of his stuffing that he knew contained meat.

Scenario 2

1. A woman who is active in anti-racist organizations visits some relatives whom she has not seen since she was a child. After meeting them, she discovers that they are racists. She decides to hide her attitudes when talking to them to avoid conflict.
2. A woman who is active in anti-racist organizations visits some relatives whom she has not seen since she was a child. After meeting them, she discovers that they are racists. She decides to hide her attitudes when talking to them so that they will like her.

Severity of Behavior

Scenario 1

1. Steve tells his friends that pornography is disgusting. Later, the friends discover several Victoria Secret's magazines in Steve's room.
2. Steve tells his friends that pornography is disgusting. Later, the friends discover hard-core pornography in Steve's room.
3. Steve tells his friends that pornography is disgusting. Later, the friends discover child pornography in Steve's room.

Scenario 2

1. A parent tells her daughter that it is sinful to have sex before marriage. However, the parent had numerous sexual partners before she was married.
2. A parent tells her daughter that she should always try to complete her homework as soon as she gets home from school. However, the parent did not always complete her homework when she was a student.

Scenario 3

1. Linda thinks that cheating is immoral. She recently cheated on her husband by sleeping with another man one time.
2. Linda thinks that cheating is immoral. She recently cheated on her boyfriend by kissing another man one time.

Appendix B: Manipulation Check Questions

Intent to Deceive

The manipulation check items for the "intent to deceive" scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Did not at all intend to deceive*, 7 = *Definitely intended to deceive*).

Scenario 1: Did the parent intent to deceive his son regarding his past drug use?

Scenario 2: Did Jane intend to deceive others regarding her sexual history?

Scenario 3: Did Paul intend to deceive others regarding his diet?

Scenario 4: Did Dan intend to deceive his students regarding his cigarette habit?

Weakness of Will

The manipulation check items for the "weakness of will" scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Did not try at all*, 7 = *Tried extremely hard*).

Scenario 1: How hard, if at all, do you think Jane tried to resist taking painkillers?

Scenario 2: How hard, if at all, do you think the priest tried to resist sleeping with the woman?

Scenario 3: How hard, if at all, do you think Nikki tried to resist having sex with her boyfriend?

Self-Deception

The manipulation check items for the "self-deception" scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Did not at all deceive himself*, 7 = *Definitely deceived himself*).

Scenario 1: To what extent do you think Ronald truly deceived himself regarding his study habits?

Scenario 2: To what extent do you think Rick truly deceived himself regarding his sexuality?

Degree of Discrepancy

The manipulation check items for the “degree of discrepancy” scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (*1 = Not at all related, 7 = Definitely related*).

Scenario 1

1. How related, if at all, is getting a tattoo and smoking two packs of cigarettes?
2. How related, if at all, is getting a tattoo and having body piercings?
3. How related, if at all, is having a tattoo and wanting to get a tattoo?

Scenario 2

1. How related, if at all, is eating three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries and being involved in a community program to eliminate pornography?
2. How related, if at all, is eating three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries and being involved in a community program to raise awareness on the importance of exercise?
3. How related, if at all, is eating three cheeseburgers and two orders of French fries and walking in a relay to support the fight against cholesterol and heart disease?

Scenario 3

1. How related, if at all, is being in the X-rated section of a video store and protesting casino gambling?
2. How related, if at all, is being in the X-rated section of a video store and helping with a community church bake sale?
3. How related, if at all, is being in the X-rated section of a video store and helping with a community program to eliminate pornography?

Public Pronouncements

The manipulation check items that assessed both the degree to which the actor made a public expression of attitudes and judged others were measured on a 7-point scale (*1 = Not at all vocal, 7 = Extremely Vocal; 1 = S/he doesn't judge them at all, 7 = S/he definitely judges them*).

Scenario 1

1. How vocal do you think Diane was about her attitudes regarding premarital sex?
2. How much do you think Diane judges others who have engaged in premarital sex?

Scenario 2

1. How vocal do you think John was about his attitudes regarding cheating?
2. How much do you think John judges others who have cheated on a test?

Scenario 3

1. How vocal do you think Heather was about her attitudes regarding illegal drugs?
2. How much do you think Heather judges others who have taken illegal drugs?

Outcome

The manipulation check items for the “outcome” scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Extremely Negative*, 4 = *Neutral*, 7 = *Extremely Positive*).

Scenarios 1–3: How positive or negative do you think the outcome of this scenario was?

Competing Values

The manipulation check items for the ‘competing values’ scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Not at all his/her reason*, 7 = *Definitely his/her main reason*).

Scenario 1

1. Do you think Noah’s main reason for eating the stuffing was to avoid conflict?
2. Do you think Noah’s main reason for eating the stuffing was selfish?

Scenario 2

1. Do you think the woman’s main reason for hiding her attitudes was to avoid conflict?
2. Do you think the woman’s main reason for hiding her attitudes was selfish?

Severity of Behavior

The manipulation check items for the ‘severity of behavior’ scenarios were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *Not bad at all*, 7 = *Extremely bad*).

Scenario 1

1. How bad do you think it is to look at Victoria Secret’s magazines?
2. How bad do you think it is to look at hard-core pornography?
3. How bad do you think it is to look at child pornography?

Scenario 2

1. How bad do you think it is to have numerous sex partners before marriage?
2. How bad do you think it is to not complete homework?

Scenario 3

1. How bad do you think it is to cheat on a husband by sleeping with another man one time?
2. How bad do you think it is to cheat on a boyfriend by kissing another man one time?

Appendix C: Results Table

Intent to Deceive	Degree of Intention [M, (SD)]	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>		
	$F(2, 204) = 36.86^*$	
Honest	2.47 (1.48) ^a	56.8% ^a
Withholding	3.65 (1.94) ^b	53.6% ^a
Deceptive	4.89 (1.94) ^c	69.3% ^b
<i>Scenario 2</i>		
	$F(2, 204) = 61.54^*$	
Honest	2.67 (1.48) ^a	72.7% ^a
Withholding	4.46 (2.01) ^b	94.4% ^b
Deceptive	6.26 (1.08) ^c	96.1% ^b
<i>Scenario 3</i>		
	$F(2, 204) = 36.86^*$	
Honest	3.71 (2.01) ^a	45.8% ^a
Withholding	4.79 (1.67) ^b	84.2% ^b
Deceptive	6.23 (1.12) ^c	97.2% ^c
<i>Scenario 4</i>		
	$F(2, 204) = 51.89^*$	
Honest	2.54 (1.53) ^a	38.9% ^a
Withholding	3.96 (1.96) ^b	71.4% ^b
Deceptive	5.61 (1.70) ^c	90.3% ^c
Weakness of Will	Degree of Resistance	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>		
	$F(3, 280) = 84.40^*$	
One-time due to back injury	5.83 (1.34) ^a	11.9% ^a
Addiction due to back injury	5.36 (1.37) ^{ab}	45.5% ^b
One-time due to peer pressure	4.79 (1.49) ^b	64.4% ^c
Habitual use for pleasure	2.52 (1.42) ^c	91.8% ^d
<i>Scenario 2</i>		
	$t(148) = 1.00$	
One-time affair	4.50 (1.77) ^a	83.2% ^a
Long-term affair	4.22 (1.77) ^a	91.8% ^b
<i>Scenario 3</i>		
	$t(132) = 2.00^*$	
Change of mind	3.53 (1.59) ^a	37.6% ^a
Gives in to desire	3.03 (1.30) ^b	48.2% ^a
Self-Deception	Degree of Self-deception	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>		
	$t(148) = -0.31$	
Self-aware	5.49 (1.45) ^a	90% ^a
Self-deceived	5.41 (1.53) ^a	70.3% ^b
<i>Scenario 2</i>		
	$t(132) = 2.87^*$	
Self-aware	4.71 (1.89) ^a	72.3% ^a
Self-deceived	5.63 (1.75) ^b	85.5% ^b

(continued)

Continued.

Degree of Discrepancy	Degree of Relatedness	% indicated hypocritical	
<i>Scenario 1</i>			
	$F(2, 203) = 22.94^*$		
Tattoo	4.61 (1.58) ^a	74.7% ^a	
Body Piercings	3.86 (1.74) ^b	23.7% ^b	
Heavy smoking	2.75 (1.74) ^c	14.2% ^c	
<i>Scenario 2</i>			
	$F(2, 209) = 99.06^*$		
Pornography	1.46 (1.03) ^a	4% ^a	
Exercise	4.42 (1.77) ^b	35.1% ^b	
Cholesterol and heart disease	4.72 (1.03) ^c	62.5% ^c	
<i>Scenario 3</i>			
	$F(2, 224) = 101.07^*$		
Casino Gambling	2.71 (1.56) ^a	5.6% ^a	
Church bake sale	3.21 (1.95) ^b	42.6% ^b	
Pornography	6.14 (1.22) ^c	89.3% ^c	
Public Pronouncements	Vocal	Judgmental	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>			
	$F(2, 203) = 61.52^*$	$F(2, 202) = 11.66^*$	
Private	2.74 (1.74) ^a	4.92 (1.56) ^a	69.7% ^a
Public	4.72 (1.84) ^b	4.87 (1.84) ^a	98.6% ^b
Public/Judgmental	5.68 (1.36) ^c	5.97 (1.33) ^b	98.7% ^b
<i>Scenario 2</i>			
	$F(3, 279) = 68.85^*$	$F(3, 280) = 6.16^{*1}$	
Private	2.41 (1.59) ^a	4.81 (1.56)	48.1% ^a
Private/Judgmental	2.77 (1.82) ^a	5.51 (1.30)	91.2% ^b
Public	5.04 (1.50) ^b	5.28 (1.25)	95.8% ^c
Public/Judgmental	5.40 (1.24) ^b	5.74 (1.39)	97.4% ^c
<i>Scenario 3</i>			
	$F(2, 209) = 48.96^*$	$F(2, 208) = 8.01^*$	
Private	2.46 (1.87) ^a	4.49 (1.61) ^a	64.5% ^a
Public	4.56 (1.51) ^b	4.84 (1.26) ^a	93.1% ^b
Public/Judgmental	5.09 (1.61) ^b	5.47 (1.30) ^b	96.1% ^b
Severity of Outcome	Positivity of Outcome	% indicated hypocritical	
<i>Scenario 1</i>			
	$t(148) = 8.76^*$		
Successful Career	4.49 (1.28) ^a	33.1% ^a	
Quits Career	3.01 (1.36) ^b	37.9% ^a	
<i>Scenario 2</i>			
	$t(148) = 18.72^*$		
Successful Career	5.83 (1.30) ^a	35% ^a	
Quits Career	2.01 (1.19) ^b	25% ^a	
<i>Scenario 3</i>			
	$t(132) = 18.13^*$		
Famous Pianist	5.98 (1.26) ^a	18% ^a	
High-school drop-out	2.06 (1.22) ^b	55% ^b	
Competing Values	Conflict	Selfish	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>			
	$t(148) = 11.96^*$	$t(148) = 2.97^*$	
Accepting family	2.78 (1.73) ^a	3.17 (1.71) ^a	43% ^a
Unaware family	5.76 (1.27) ^b	2.39 (1.48) ^b	30% ^b
<i>Scenario 2</i>			
	$t(131) = 1.53$	$t(131) = 1.05$	
Avoid conflict	6.14 (0.93) ^a	3.30 (1.50) ^a	34% ^a
Gain approval	5.84 (1.23) ^a	3.62 (1.89) ^a	54% ^b

(continued)

Continued.

Severity of Behavior	Severity of Behavior	% indicated hypocritical
<i>Scenario 1</i>	$F(2, 204) = 152.17^*$	
Mild	2.47 (1.53) ^a	51.4% ^a
Moderate	3.97 (1.53) ^b	89.5% ^b
Severe	6.68 (0.17) ^c	98.7% ^c
<i>Scenario 2</i>	$t(151) = 5.34^*$	
Homework	4.76 (1.33) ^a	22.3% ^a
Premarital Sex	3.40 (1.77) ^b	75.8% ^b
<i>Scenario 3</i>	$t(127) = 4.34^*$	
Sexual Infidelity	6.49 (1.53) ^a	88.2% ^a
Mild Infidelity	2.47 (1.53) ^b	71.4% ^b

*Statistic is significant at the 0.05 level or less.

¹1 versus 2 is sig; 1 versus 3 is non-significant (ns); 1 versus 4 is sig; 2 versus 3 is ns; 2 versus 4 is ns; 3 versus 4 is ns. Note: ^a, ^b and ^c that differ within the same cell are significantly different at the 0.05 level or less unless indicated marginal significance in text.

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